Cuba is his first case. America wanted Cuba to adhere to American visions which meant wealth for the sugar planters and their American backers. When Cuba sought its own course and threw off a repressive regime, America objected. The rift has existed ever since as no American administration will ever acknowledge Cuba's right to govern its own affairs so long as Castro is in power.
Williams then systematically follows the years from 1898 through 1961 and paints a similar picture. It does not take the reader long to get the idea and carry the argument beyond Williams' parameters and show that everything from Grenada to Lebanon to Afghanistan to Iraq can be shown in the same light. American puppet governments are not granting freedom and democracy to their constituents as much as they are part of a ruling class dominated by the business interests that exploit their workforce and deny requests for reform until the entire population is ripe for rebellion (remember the Shah of Iran). One wonders if the Saudi government is the next great western ally to fall victim to a popular revolt of Muslim fundamentalists.
Williams is a master of detail and works his arguments creatively in an entertaining fashion. Neoconservatives of today will have the same objections as their predecessors from the 1950s in acknowledging Williams as a valid author. But Williams makes a strong case and if more people were exposed to his writing, our country might even find a way to avoid the same pitfalls. A Saudi revolution would disrupt oil markets and jeopardize world economies. Perhaps if some thought is put into policy such a scenario is avoidable and preventable. If people are willing to give Williams a chance American foreign policy might eventually reflect a broader American vision rather than the interests of a few.
I found this book to be fascinating, sometimes insightful and sometimes propagandistic. As Bradford Perkins says in his essay on the book's influence, this is a manifesto rather than a monograph. The politics of the author appear clearly on the very first page, as he condemns the American invasion of Cuba and holds the policy behind that move up as a shining example of the tragedy of American diplomacy in his eyes. Williams' acknowledged radical views are spread liberally throughout the book, and they often serve to disrupt my own interest in some of his arguments. Basically, he says the drive for economic expansion, as espoused in the Open Door Doctrine of the late 1890s, determined American foreign policy from that time on, that it became a veritable axiom of American political thought. In Williams' eyes, the intensive desire to expand America's market and sell her surplus products throughout the world led to a problematic form of economic imperialism and inevitably did much to start the Cold War. His discussion of economic policy as foreign policy in the wake of the depression of the 1890s and up until the end of World War II struck me as very insightful and even compelling. While he says that America's intentions were indeed humanitarian, the policy caused other nations to resent America's dominating influence in their societies and further fueled the revolutions of the first half of the twentieth century. Williams' argument diminishes in impact, however, when he comes to discuss the origins of the Cold War. His portrait of the U.S. is one of an economically aggressive, imperial power seeking to remake the world in America's image. He contends that America was in fact the opposite of isolationist in its policies and that its steps forced the Soviet Union into a corner and brought on the Cold War.
William's intense radicalism thwarts his own efforts. He goes out of his way to defend the Soviet Union and its policies. He describes Stalin as a man who had no intention of spreading communism, only wanting to secure his own borders after World War II. America is the bully that "forces" Stalin to take over Eastern Europe and install the iron curtain there. His U.S.S.R. is one always looking to compromise and to live in peace with the terrible Americans. It is easy to see why some critics labeled Williams a Stalinist tool and dangerous Marxist intellectual. Williams pleads that he is not saying economic determinism is behind his theories, but the fact that his arguments are largely Marxist and all but solely economic in nature leads me to believe he only wanted to avoid being labeled as the socialist he was. I often found Williams to destroy what were valid arguments by slipping in snide political remarks--the most galling of which was that America's efforts to penetrate the Chinese market in the 1930s led the U.S. to go to war with Japan (as if America was the belligerent and not the victim of Japanese attack).
I do want to emphasize the fact that Williams does present some interesting and compelling ideas about economics and foreign policy. While I disagree completely with his overall view, I have to praise parts of the book for effectively making points worthy of consideration and of great value in understanding America's history of diplomacy in the 20th century. Anyone deeply interested in the subject almost has to read Williams because this book has affected the nature of the debate; if you are a conservative such as myself, you may have to grit your teeth through some sections, but you will reap definite rewards from reading this book.
