Gewirth tries to steer a middle course between the extremes of "libertarianism" and "socialism," and as a libertarian myself I must say that he is not always successful; my own opinion is that his strictly political discussion (on e.g. the legitimacy of taxation and the "supportive state") fails to make some crucially important distinctions. But his _moral_ arguments are generally quite compelling all the same. And I heartily endorse, at least in spirit, his account of the "duty to rescue" on which some of his political conclusions are based: under certain circumstances, if one can help to "rescue" someone else whose life is at risk, with no "comparable cost" to oneself, then one is morally obliged to do so. (In my own view, this is so obviously rational that I wouldn't even bother calling it a "duty"; surely it is what any sane and benevolent person would do. Which, really, is Gewirth's point, although he makes it deontologically rather than teleologically.)
In short, this work on ethical rationalism is well worth reading even for those who, like me, may disagree with some of Gewirth's strictly political conclusions. And even those conclusions fare well enough if we may take the liberty(!) of allowing nongovernmental social institutions to fulfill the undoubtedly legitimate functions Gewirth unnecessarily assigns to the "state."
Postmoderns and antifoundationalists will, of course, faint at the very mention of a "supreme principle of rationality." One need not diavow rationalism, however, to quarrel with Professor Gewirth's thesis. My issue with Gewirth is that I do not believe his argument can ever transcend the self-orientated prudentiality of his "dialectically necessary" method of justification.
Does morality truly spring from prudential concern?
Rescher argues against Gewirth's strategy more concisely than I could.
"At this point, someone might offer the following objection:
---------------------- You are quite right to insist that a prudential rationale for morality does not provide for the deontic force of moral claims. But what it can (and presumably does) accomplish is to establish that we a re rationally well advised to deem ourselves (and others) to be morally obligated in the full-blooded-duty-oriented sense of the term. That is, it can show that we are prudentially bound to believe in the deontic force of morality. -----------------------------
However, this tactic still cannot provide a satisfactory rationale for authentic morality. It yields no more than a sham morality, because it does not go to show that we ever actually are obligated to moral action, only that we are prudentially well-advised to think ourselves (and others) to be so obligated . . . " (Rescher, _Objectivity_, pp. 151-154).
To get to the bottom of the issue, even if I, as a prospective purposive agent, realize that I have a right to claim goods necessary to my agency,_and_ that in this respect I am not different from other prospective purposive agents, and that they as well may make the same rights claims, at no point does the dialectically necessary method require that I morally respect the claims of others in the same way that I respect my own prudential right claims.
