The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century | Thomas P.M. Barnett

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century | Thomas P.M. Barnett | Too little too late

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The Pentagon's New...

	The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century Thomas P.M. Barnett, 2005 - 448 pages average customer review:based on 115 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

Global cop

Barnett's main thesis in "The Pentagon's New Map" is that the world is composed of two types of states: those that are part of an integrated and connected "Core," which embrace globalization; and states of the "Gap," which are disconnected from the effects of globalization. Barnett proclaims that globalization will move the world into an era of peace and prosperity, but can only do so with the help of an indispensable United States. He writes that America is the lynchpin to the entire process and he believes that the United States should be midwife to a new world that will one day consist of peaceful democratic states and integrated economies. Barnett is proposing no less than a new grand strategy - the historical successor to the Cold War's strategy of containment. His approach to a future world defined by America's "exportation of security" is almost religious in its fervor and messianic in its language.

The foundation upon which Barnett builds his binary view of the world is heavily dependant upon the continued advancement of globalization - almost exclusively so. However, advancing globalization is not pre-ordained. Barnett himself makes the case that globalization is a fragile undertaking similar to an interconnected chain in which any broken link destroys the whole. Globalization could indeed be like the biblical statue whose feet are made of clay. Globalization, and therefore the integration of the Gap, may even stop or recede - just as the globalization of the early 20th century ended abruptly with the onset of WW I and a global depression. Moreover, Barnett's contention that the United States has an exceptional duty and moral responsibility for "remaking the world in America's image" might be seen by many as misguided and perhaps even dangerous.

The divide between the `Functioning Core' and the `Non-Integrating Gap' differs from the gulf between rich and poor in a subtle yet direct way. State governments make a conscious decision to become connected vs. disconnected to advancing globalization. States and their leaders can provide the infrastructure and the opening of large global markets to their citizens in ways that individuals cannot. An example can serve to illustrate the point: You can be rich and disconnected in Nigeria or poor and disconnected in North Korea. In each case the country you live in has decided to be disconnected. Citizens in this case have a limited likelihood of staying rich and unlimited prospects of staying poor. But by becoming part of the functioning Core, the enlightened state allows all citizens a running start at becoming part of a worldwide economic system and thus provide prospects for a better future because global jobs and markets are opened up to them. A connected economy such as India's, for example, enables citizens who once had no prospects for a better life to find well-paying jobs, such as computer-related employment. Prospects for a better Indian life are directly the result of the Indian government's conscious decision to become connected to the world economy, a.k.a. embracing globalization.

After placing his theory of the Core/Gap and preemptive war strategy firmly into the church of globalization, Barnett next places his theory squarely upon the alter of rule sets. Few would argue that the world is an anarchic place and Barnett tells us that rule sets are needed to define `good' and `evil' behavior of actors in this chaotic international system. An example of such a rule set is the desire of the Core to keep WMDs out of the hands of terrorist organizations. Other examples are the promulgation of human rights and the need to stop genocide. Barnett also uses rule sets to define `system' rules that govern and shape the actions, and even the psychology, of international actors. An example that Barnett gives of a system-wide rule set is the creation of the `rule' defined by the United States during the Cold War called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Barnett claims that this rule set effectively ended the possibility of war for all time amongst nuclear-capable great powers. Barnett states that the U.S. now should export a brand new rule set called `preemptive war,' which aims to fight actors in the lawless Gap in order to end international terrorism for all time. Barnett makes it clear that the Core's enemy is neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (Middle East), but a condition (disconnectedness).

Next, Barnett points out that system-wide competition has moved into the economic arena and that military conflict, when it occurs, has moved away from the system-wide (Cold War), to inter-state war, ending up today with primarily state conflict vs. individuals (Core vs. bin Laden, Core vs. Kim, etc.). In other words, "we are moving progressively away from warfare against states or even blocs of states and toward a new era of warfare against individuals." Rephrased, we've moved from confrontations with evil empires, to evil states, to evil leaders. An example of this phenomenon is the fact that China dropped off the radar of many government hawks after 9/11 only to be replaced by terrorist groups and other dangerous NGOs "with global reach."

Barnett also points out that the idea of `connectivity' is central to the success of globalization. Without it, everything else fails. Connectivity is the glue that holds states together and helps prevent war between states. For example, the US is not likely to start a war with `connected' France, but America could more likely instigate a war with `disconnected' North Korea, Syria or Iran.

Barnett then examines the dangers associated with his definition of `disconnectedness.' He cleverly describes globalization as a condition defined by mutually assured dependence (MAD) and advises us that `Big Men', royal families, raw materials, theocracies and just bad luck can conspire to impede connectedness in the world. This is one of few places in his book that Barnett briefly discusses impediments to globalization - however, this short list looks at existing roadblocks to connectedness but not to future, system-wide dangers to globalization.

At this point in his book, Barnett also makes bold statements that America is never leaving the Gap and that we are therefore never "bringing our boys home." He believes that there is no exiting the Gap, only shrinking it. These statements have incited some of Barnett's critics to accuse him of fostering and advocating a state of perpetual war. Barnett rebuts these attacks by claiming that, "America's task is not perpetual war, nor the extension of empire. It is merely to serve as globalization's bodyguard wherever and whenever needed throughout the Gap." Barnett claims that the strategy of preemptive war is a "boundable problem," yet his earlier claim that we are never leaving the Gap and that our boys are never coming home does not square with his assertion that there will not be perpetual war. He cannot have it both ways.

Barnett then takes us on a pilgrimage to the Ten Commandments of globalization. Tellingly, this list is set up to be more like links in a chain than commandments. Each item in the list is connected to the next - meaning that each step is dependent upon its predecessor. If any of the links are broken or incomplete, the whole is destroyed. For example, Barnett warns us that if there is no security in the Gap, there can be no rules in the Gap. Barnett therefore undermines his own globalization-based grand strategy by pointing out in detail at least ten things that can go wrong with globalization - the foundation upon which his theory is built.

What else could kill globalization? Barnett himself tells us: "Labor, energy, money and security all need to flow as freely as possible from those places in the world where they are plentiful to those regions where they are scarce." Here he is implying that an interruption of any or all of these basic necessities can doom globalization. Barnett states clearly: "...(these are) the four massive flows I believe are essential to protect if Globalization III is going to advance." Simply put, any combination of American isolationism or closing of borders to immigration, a global energy crisis, a global financial crisis or rampant global insecurity could adversely affect "connectedness," a.k.a. globalization. These plausible future events, unnerving as they are, leave the inexorable advancement of globalization in doubt and we haven't yet explored other problems with Barnett's reliance on globalization to make the world peaceful, free and safe for democracy.

Barnett goes on to tell us that Operation Iraqi Freedom was an "overt attempt to create a "System Perturbation" centered in the Persian Gulf to trigger a Big Bang." His definition of a Big Bang in the Middle East is the democratization of the many totalitarian states in the region. He also claims that the Big Bang has targeted Iran's "sullen majority."

Barnett claims that our problem with shrinking the Gap is not our "motive or our means, but our inability to describe the enemies worth killing, the battles worth winning, and the future worth creating." Managing the global campaign to democratize the world is no easy task. Barnett admits that in a worst-case scenario we may be stuck in the "mother of all intifadas" in Iraq. Critics claim this is something that we should have planned for - that the insurgency should not have been a surprise, and that it should have been part of the "peacemaking" planning. Barnett blithely states that things will get better "...when America internationalizes the occupation." Barnett should not engage in wishful thinking here, as he also does when he predicted that Iraqis would be put in charge of their own country 18 months after the fall of Baghdad. It would be more accurate if he claimed this would happen 18 months after the cessation of hostilities. Some critics claim that Iraq is an example that we are an "empire in a hurry" (Michael Ignatieff), which then results in: 1) allocating insufficient resources to non-military aspects of the project and 2) attempting economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame.

The final basic premise of Barnett's theory of the Core and the Gap is the concept of what he calls the "global transaction strategy." Barnett explains it best: "America's essential transaction with the outside world is one of our exporting security in return for the world's financing a lifestyle we could far more readily afford without all that defense spending." Barnett claims that America pays the most for global stability because we enjoy it the most. But what about the other 80 countries in the Core?
Why is America, like Atlas, bearing the weight of the world's security and stabilization on its shoulders?

Barnett claims that historical analogies are useless today and point us in the wrong direction. I disagree. James Madison cautioned us not to go abroad to seek monsters to destroy. We can learn from his simple and profound statement that there are simply too many state (and individual) monsters in today's world for the U.S. to destroy unilaterally or preemptively. We must also avoid overstretching our resources and power. Thucydides reminds us that the great democracy of Athens was brought to its knees by the ill-advised Sicilian expedition - which resulted in the destruction of everything the Athenians held dear. Do not ignore history as Barnett councils; heed it.

Globalization is likely here to stay, though it may be slowed down or even stopped in some regions of the planet. Therefore, America needs to stay engaged in the affairs of the world, but Barnett has not offered conclusive evidence that the U.S. needs to become the world's single Leviathan that must extinguish all global hot wars. Barnett also has not proved that America needs to be, as he writes, "the one willing to rush in when everyone else is running away." People like Barnett in academia and leaders in government may proclaim and ordain the U.S. to be a global Leviathan, but it is a conscious choice that should be thoroughly debated by the American people. After all, it is upon the backs of the American people that such a global Leviathan must ride. Where is the debate? The American people, upon reflection, may decide upon other courses of action.

I would strongly recommend "The Pentagon's New Map" to students who are studying U.S. foreign policy. I would also recommend it to those who are studying the Bush administration as well as the Pentagon. The ideas in the book seem to be popular with the military and many of its ideas can be seen in the current thinking and policy of the Pentagon and State Department. It seems to be well researched - having 35 pages of notes. Many of Barnett's citations come from the Washington Post and the New York Times, which some may see as a liberal bias, but I see the sources as simply newspapers of record. I would only caution the reader that Barnett's theories are heavily dependent upon the continued advancement of globalization, which in turn is dependent upon the continued economic ability of the U.S. to sustain military operations around the world indefinitely. Neither is guaranteed.

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Too little too late

At first reading Mr. Barnett makes some sense. For instance, a reorganization of the military into peace-keeping and war-fighting roles might indeed make us better adept at peace-keeping, something America has not done well since perhaps the Phillipine uprising of the early 20th century. However, there is little to persuade us that the current thinking enmeshed in the military leadership will be different simply because they are reorganized into different groups with different names. If the right people are not promoted and the industrial and congressional parts of the military-industrial-congressional complex are not disconnected, the same problems will remain, just in a new organizational structure with new names. Something more drastic than even major reorganization will be required. Mr. Barnett's recommendations are better than a bandaid on the infection but they still fall short of the radical surgery needed to remove the source of the infection. It is, as the old saying goes, too little too late.

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Not so much a new map as a justification for the current map

The central thesis of this book is that the United States trades "security" to the rest of the world to the rest of the world to "balance" out what would otherwise be huge trade and financial deficits. The author develops an elaborate philsophical strategy to explain and to justify the thesis which is presented in the book. The flaw in the book however is that rather than philsophy or grand strategy, what Barnett is presenting amounts to a political policy defense of the current American President. He starts with the status quo today as an ideal and attempts to bend everything happening in the world around that. America is the New Jerusalem come to save the nations of the world and America is seemingly guided by the great invisible hand toward that goal.

Barnett's political views are not very complex. The world is divided into "US" and "THEM" with the United States as the leader-country, countries in various states of dependency on the united states and the implacable enemy-states (THEM) whose inevitable future is destruction. He presents a warped version of globalization where the only links between countries in the world he sees are links between America and other countries. He doesn't (for example) see China on the march in places like South America and Africa kicking US companies out of places where they were commerically entrenched for generations. He only sees trade going between the US and China.

His view on the military is confused. He presents an arguement that the US is the best country to supply security to the world based on the strength of US armed forces. He then says that the days of transnational conflicts are over and that wars like Iraq are the future of warfare. The connection he never makes is that the "strength" of the US armed forces is not compatible with fighting wars like Iraq. The US military is a high-tech small-numbers force designed to crush national armies. It is small in number and very expensive. If the future of the world is many more conflicts like Iraq, the US military is the wrong force to provide security to the world. Barnett's logic would led to in fact that rather than the US being the future of world security, its countries like India and China who have military forces much more suited to the task. Large low-tech/low-cost armies that the US simply cannot provide. If we accept that the world pays the US for security and that insurgencies like Iraq are the future of war, what Barnett seems to be pointing to is the inevitable decline of the United States and the rise of some other world system. Barnett doesn't explore these dangerous questions because in the book he can't abandon his premise that America is the great leader-country of the world and is fated to greatness.

In terms of economics, Barnett fails to understand that what he calls globalization is a two-edged sword. Integration and economic dependency are not a one-way process. The more tightly integrated economies are, the more that other countries exert influcence over American policies. If, for example, there are security vs. trade issues involving China, many American companies will pick trade because of their own self-interests.

The attitude in the book is also a problem. Barnett isn't interested in debating and proving a case. He comes across as if he has somehow found the pure truth and that anyone who doesn't agree with him just doesn't "get it". I get what he is saying and what he is saying doesn't hold up. He comes across like a guy who sits around either talking at people who agree with him or operates in a closed circle of like-minded people.

Some random observations:

1) He fails to understand that a civil-affairs military isn't something that the US can actually produce or afford. There is simply no way to get the sort of large numbers of educated young people it would take to do what he wants to do. Even filling the main-force army is difficult. But where are hundreds of thousands of additional highly educated and motivated young people with language skills going to come from?

2) Barnett has a poor understanding of the performance of the US military in recent wars. Part of it could be his navy background, but he seems totally ignorant about the realities of recent wars on the ground.

3) When he sets out regional priorities for saving the world, he brings nothing to the table. He is just echoing Rumsfeld and current pentagon policy. Rather than question, for example, why Colombia is even marginally important to US strategy, he blindly accepts it. While at the same time, he ignores the quickly rising dependency of the US on African oil and the competition with the Chinese for influence in Africa.

4) If Barnett is going to be dismissive of history as a teacher, he should not use historical lessons himself as if they are proof-points. And if the lessons of history no long (as he seems to claim) apply, he needs to invent a new system to show why anyone should accept his ideas.

I think this book is useful in understanding how people like Barnett view the world. But as a strategy for Pentagon or anyone else, the book falls short. The first step for anyone who wants to consider grand international strategies is to park preconceptions at the door. Barnett ended up creating what is less a strategy than it is a philsophy whose underpinnings are a blindless to looking at the problems with America's position in the world.

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Ambitious, pleasantly arrogant, often thought provoking, occasionally convincing.

Barnett is very ambitious in this book, pleasantly arrogant in tone, slightly presumptuous in his conclusions, but often thought provoking and occasionally convincing.

According to Barnett, connectivity (read globalization) is the key to world peace and prosperity. Countries that are integrated into the world economy don't go to war with each other. Standards of living rise leading to less frustration and less violence internally and towards the world. Connectivity is therefore a moral good with essentially limitless potential for making the world a better place. The United States, as the sole remaining superpower, has a responsibility to maintain a safe environment for globalization. It should aggressively expand globalization by being the Leviathan that provides the order necessary for commerce and connectivity. America's military is so vastly superior to any competitor that it is the de-facto Leviathan. America should use preemptive war to remove really disruptive forces from power and expand connectivity to their countries.

If America does this then the non-integrated gap will shrink, eventually disappearing (the disappearing is implied in the book, not explicit), and the world will have "a future worth creating."

A few criticisms:

I'm uncomfortable with the future being defined with such clear terms and such broad strokes. The broad strokes by nature don't address the details of his argument and it is at the detail level that the truth or falsehood of a theory can be examined. Otherwise, his theory is merely an assertion, and whether I accept it or not has less to do with its basis in reality than with the package it comes in: the persuasiveness of its presenter (a matter of rhetoric rather than evidence), anecdotal evidence, illustrations, etc.

I appreciate his effort to paint the future in an optimistic light but I think that his statement that "the end of war is within our historical grasp" is wrong. I see no indicators of war's demise. It seems alive and well.

Also, I find it dangerous to extrapolate too much from current trends, which is what Barnett is essentially doing. He takes the past 15-25 years and looks at what globalization has caused in that time. It has been truly amazing. But to extend that trajectory, sans hiccups, into the indefinite future, is to commit the same fallacy that most prophets fall to: The future as an extension of the present. That said I want to have that hope... the end of war and internal state violence are definitely goals to shoot for. But not realistic ones, I fear.

I agree with him that we probably won't end up going to war with China... but I disagree with him regarding their capabilities. They are more capable than he gives them credit for, and the situation is not quite as in-the-bag as he indicates.

So, I come away appreciating some of his big points, even if he doesn't spell out their mechanics: globalization will bring an increasing level of prosperity to the regions it touches. Good. I agree, with reservations. Is globalization the unalloyed moral good he seems to think it is? Is it something worth shedding blood over? I don't propose an alternative but I am uncomfortable with the ease that war becomes an option in this book.

I'm also hesitant about his role of the US as the Leviathan of the world. I agree that no military in the world is America's equal, and no military in the world could take on the role of international system guarantor... but ability does not equal moral imperative.

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